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Contemporary research, often with looking-time tasks, reveals that infants possess
foundational understandings of their social worlds. However, few studies have examined
how these early social cognitions relate to the child’s social interactions and behavior
in early development. Does an early understanding of the social world relate to how
an infant interacts with his or her parents? Do early social interactions along with
social-cognitive understandings in infancy predict later preschool social competencies?
In the current paper, we propose a theory in which children’s later social behaviors
and their understanding of the social world depend on the integration of early social
understanding and experiences in infancy. We review several of our studies, as well
as other research, that directly examine the pathways between these competencies to
support a hypothesized network of relations between social-cognitive development and
social-interactive behaviors in the development from infancy to childhood. In total, these
findings reveal differences in infant social competences that both track the developmental
trajectory of infants’ understanding of people over the first years of life and provide
external validation for the large body of social-cognitive findings emerging from laboratory
looking-time paradigms.
Keywords: infancy, social cognition, theory of mind, continuity, longitudinal predictions
Introduction
Human infants live in a social world and they develop expectations and understandings about
people’s actions and interactions in that world. Hypothetically, their understandings—their social
cognitions—simultaneously shape and are shaped by their social lives and interactions. Moreover,
early infant social understanding and interactions should hypothetically shape later social cognition
and social behavior in preschool, and beyond.
Figure 1 outlines a theoretical framework for thinking about these developmental transactions,
pathways, and achievements. Much is known about several of the topics within each box—e.g.,
infants’ understanding of intentional action, preschoolers’ understanding of false belief, and the
nature of various parent-child interactions in infancy. The connections between these boxes,
however, are only just beginning to be examined. Thus, considering this framework as a guide,
our current knowledge is patchy and incomplete. In this article, we aim to help fill in this bigger
theoretical picture about how early social cognition is informed by social context and vice versa.
First, we review and report three illustrative studies of our own that tackle the ways in which early
social cognition and social behavior fit together. These studies focus on the links labeled as 1, 2, and
3 in Figure 1. Using those studies as anchors, we review other emerging research that addresses these
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FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized theoretical framework for comprehensively
looking at the pathways between early childhood social cognitions
and social behavior. Path 1 is examined in Study 1. Path 2 is examined in
isolation in Study 2. Paths 2 and 3 are both assessed in Study 3. Social
cognitions and behaviors not explicitly dealt with in this paper appear in
parentheses (topics listed are for illustrative purposes and are not exhaustive).
Social cognitions and social behaviors outside of parentheses are those we
directly address in this paper.
same links. Finally, we briefly discuss portions of this network that
still need to be studied.
Study 1: Relations between Intention
Understanding and Infants’ Larger Social
Experiences
Background
Two methodological approaches characterize contemporary
research on infant development: looking-time methods that
reveal infants’ basic understandings of the world, and measures of
individual differences that characterize variation among infants
in their social contexts (e.g., parent–infant interaction or infant
temperament). Surprisingly little research combines both of these
methods and perspectives and this is particularly true in research
encompassing infant social cognition.
Based on numerous recent studies of infant social cognition, it
is nowwell accepted that during their first year of life infants come
to understand that intentional, or goal-directed, states underlie
the actions and expressions of others (Baird and Astington, 2005;
Sommerville et al., 2005; Akhtar and Martinez-Sussmann, 2007;
Tomasello et al., 2005). As noted in Figure 1, this includes appre-
ciating agents as intentional actors (engaged in deliberate acts like
reaching for and getting things) and as intentional experiencers
(experiencing states like desires for, emotions about, and per-
ceptions of things). Although these characterizations rest partly
on studies where infants engage in active interaction with others
(Carpenter et al., 1998; Saylor et al., 2007; Gräfenhain et al., 2009),
the large majority of the relevant studies have used looking-time
paradigms where infants look at and react to agents’ actions and
expressions (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998; Sodian
and Thoermer, 2004).
At the same time, much research in the attachment and tem-
perament traditions has examined infant and parent–infant social
actions and interactions. Specifically, attachment research has
shown that the sensitivity of mothers’ responses to their infants
(Rosenblum et al., 2008; Bigelow et al., 2010) is consistently associ-
ated with a secure attachment style. Also, infant attachment status
predicts and is predicted by aspects of mother–infant responsive-
ness to each other’s actions, communications, and mother–infant
affect attunement (e.g., Beebe et al., 2010). These findings suggest
that the quality of mother–infant interaction could also lead to
enhanced social-cognitive understanding of the sort measured in
infant laboratory assessments. Sensitive, responsive, contingent
mother–child interactionsmight sensitize infants to the intentions
and desires that underpin such behaviors. Beyond attachment
research, infant temperament additionally seems a good candi-
date to consider because it is widely argued to reflect important
individual differences in infancy that further influence infants’
experiences and interactions within their social worlds.
Although infant looking-time studies have provided the foun-
dation for many theories of social-cognitive development, these
studies rarely consider individual differences (as opposed to age-
related differences) in infants’ understandings. Thus, they also
rarely include analyses of infants’ social context, temperament,
and parent–infant interaction, and so almost never examine the
relations between infants’ social experiences or social behavior
and their laboratory-based social cognitions. This seems like an
important task in its own right and, moreover, such integra-
tive research would also shed light on the ecological validity of
the paradigms and findings so often used to study infant social
cognition in the laboratory.
In a recent study (Dunphy-Lelii et al., 2014), therefore,
we reported on two tasks implemented concurrently when
infants were about 12 months old: (1) a traditional looking-
time paradigm in which infants witness intentional action-
emotion displays, and (2) caregiver–infant interaction episodes.
This allowed us to examine relations between social cognition,
via looking-time intention-understandings, and social behavior
(pathway 1 in Figure 1) by taking advantage of individual dif-
ferences in both. Thus, this first study had the goal of providing
insight into relations between social behavior and social cognition
(as well as traditional looking-time paradigms and measurements
of social interaction) by investigating links between infant habit-
uation to intentional-action displays and their social interactions
and social temperaments.
Overview of Study 1
For a looking-time paradigmweused one first reported by Phillips
et al. (2002). In habituation trials infants saw a person look at one
of two objects with an expression of interest and joy. Then they
saw two test events in which the person either reached for the
“liked” object (consistent event) or the not-liked object (inconsis-
tent event). By 12–14 months of age most infants (80%) looked
longer at the inconsistent test event, a finding consistent with
other research demonstrating infants’ developing understanding
of intentional agents. We chose this task because (a) it is repre-
sentative of many used to assess intention understanding (e.g.,
Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998; Brandone and Wellman,
2009), (b) it involves infant appreciation of both actions (reaching)
and emotions (liking), and (c) this same task captures reasonable
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individual differences in infants’ looking-time as shown in a prior
study (Wellman et al., 2004).
To assess infant and mother–infant social interaction differ-
ences we included measures of the sort often used to examine the
quality of mother–infant interaction in attachment and temper-
ament research. In particular, by observing mother–infant inter-
actions, we assessed the quality of the interaction and the infant’s
temperamental orientation to and away from other people.
Almost one hundred 10- to 12-month-old infants were seen
in a multi-phase research session lasting 40–50 min. After warm
up, the protocol began with a looking-time procedure using the
paradigm from Phillips et al. (2002) just described. Caregiver and
infant then adjourned to a large playroomhousing several toys and
furniturewhere they participated in a 16-min session consisting of
free play and novel object interaction (95% of the caregivers were
mothers, sowewill refer to our data asmother–infant interaction).
Social Cognition via Looking-time Measures
Looking-time tasks typically have two phases: a habituation
or familiarization phase and a test phase. In social-cognitive
research, during infant-controlled habituation, infants view an
agent’s (or agents’) intentional behavior and emotional expres-
sions overmultiple trials until they becomehabituated—for exam-
ple the agent looks at object-A rather than object-B with interest
and pleasure. Then infants see test events that probe their under-
standing of the original actions—for example, the agent then
reaches for object-A (a consistent test event, consistent with the
agent liking and wanting that object) or object-B (an inconsistent
test event). In this study we focused on individual differences
in infants’ decrement (or, conversely, maintenance) of attention
during habituation to our emotion–action displays. Attention
during habituation acts as a measure of infants’ ability to parse
displays meaningfully and their interest in those displays; that is,
differences on this measure represent differences in processing or
interest as infants come to a stable impression of the displayed
action as being intentional. Infants’ attention to intentional-action
displays during habituation, as measured by decrement of atten-
tion, has been especially revealing in prior research (Wellman
et al., 2004; Aschersleben et al., 2008).Ourmeasure (see also,Well-
man et al., 2004) essentially involved subtracting infant looking
on the last trials of habituation from their looking on the first
trials (and then dividing by infant total habituation looking, as
recommended by Bornstein and Sigman, 1986). So a higher score
means infants’ attention decreased sizably and quickly whereas a
lower score means infants sustained their attention longer and at
higher levels.
We do not focus here on infant differential looking to consis-
tent vs. inconsistent test events because in past social-cognitive
research (Wellman et al., 2004; Aschersleben et al., 2008), it has
often proven less revealing as an individual-differences measure.
More focally, test event looking yielded little of significance in our
research as well.
Social Interaction
Measures of mother–infant free play behavior could be collected
by coding highly quantified observational tallies of specific acts
(numbers of infant reaches, or points, ormother looks at infant per
minute). But,more typically research has coded global, aggregated
categories (Hofer et al., 2008; Slaughter et al., 2008; Kaitz et al.,
2010). Arguably, global aggregates capture important individual
differences at a more informative level of analysis (Sroufe and
Waters, 1977) and we concentrated on those. Using such aggre-
gates, we focused on four key constructs inspired by findings from
attachment, temperament, and social-interaction research: quality
of mother–infant interaction, socially observant temperament,
joint attention, and imitation.
Because the quality of mother–infant interaction leads to
enhanced attachment, it might additionally lead to enhanced
social-cognitive understanding of the sort measured in infant
laboratory assessments as well; infants who interact contingently
with others who are sensitive to their own states and actionswould
be well situated to notice intentional actions and interactions and
thus to achieve a more advanced understanding of them. In our
data, quality ofmother–infant interactionwas based on aggregating
four sets of global ratings from the free play observations as
outlined on the left in Figure 2.
We also examined infants’ socially observant temperament (i.e.,
an infant’s attentiveness to social phenomena). Some aspects of
temperament (e.g., activity level) describe infants’ motoric pro-
clivities, but others (e.g., social reactivity or avoidance) are more
related to infants’ social tendencies. Because these latter aspects of
temperament can influence a child’s experiences and interactions
within their social world, they could also impact early social-
cognitive understanding. Indeed Wellman et al. (2011) showed
that a “socially observant” temperament in early preschool lon-
gitudinally predicts enhanced theory of mind 2 years later (see
also Lane et al., 2013). This temperament profile, however, was
established in work with preschool children. Based on tempera-
ment items designed for infants and toddlers (Putnamet al., 2008),
we devised items to assess something equivalent in infants. In
general, socially observant infant temperament was coded based
on whether infants noticed their parent’s facial expressions, liked
to sit and watch their parents do things, andmade talking or vocal
sounds when parents talked to them.
Two other relevant social experiences arguably could play sup-
porting roles in infants’ emerging understanding of others as
intentional agents. Joint attention is a hallmark of early cognitive
development in which infants begin to coordinate objects into
their previously dyadic social interactions—they begin tomonitor
another’s attentional stance toward themselves and the object
(see, e.g., Bakeman and Adamson, 1984). Infant imitation also
has a long history of being studied as both a precursor to, and
result of, increased social-cognitive competence. Deliberate infant
imitation is evident as early as the second half of the first year
(see Bauer and Kleinknecht, 2002), and it is related to both infant
language development and mother–infant responsiveness (e.g.,
Masur and Olson, 2008).
Findings
Many of the numerous aspects of infants’ and mothers’ behavior
in our free-play/teaching scenarios that we coded are listed in
Figure 2. In that figure, on the left behaviors are organized into
a priori aggregates that we hypothesized might predict infants’
looking-times based on the four constructs we outlined earlier
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FIGURE 2 | Two separate sets of aggregates examined in Study 1. The
set on the left is organized into four a priori aggregates and color-coded. The
set on the right is organized into four aggregates that were validated empirically
within the study. Specific items from the a priori aggregates on the left
contributed to the empirically validated aggregates, as indicated by the color of
those items, on the right.
(i.e., the quality of mother–infant interaction, socially observant
infant temperament, joint attention, and imitation). In initial anal-
yses, we correlated these aggregates with differences in decrement
of attention in the looking-time task. In Dunphy-Lelii et al. (2014)
we reported similar relations without controlling for age, as all the
participants were infants. But these infants ranged in age from 10
to 12months and the age spanbetween youngest and oldest infants
was 10weeks. This is sizable for infants aged, on average, 49weeks,
so inwhat we now report, all analyses are controlled for age in days
at infant testing.
The four left-column aggregates describing the interactions
between mother and child all correlated with our habituation
measure when controlling for age: quality of mother–infant inter-
action, r(69) = 0.31, p < 0.01; socially observant infant tempera-
ment, r(85)= 0.25, p< 0.05; imitation, r(72)= 0.27, p< 0.05; and
joint attention, r(70) = 0.24, p < 0.05. Not shown in Figure 2, we
also coded for infant attentiveness to objects (rather than persons)
as an infant behavior that could provide discriminant validity
because we predicted it would not correlate with social-cognitive
understandings. As expected, that score did not correlate with our
habituation measure either initially, r(86) =  0.03, p = 0.77 or
when controlling for age, r(85)=  0.04, p= 0.75.
Equally important, however, was a more comprehensive
empirical analysis of the interactions and behaviors that predict
looking-time measures of infant intention understanding. Here
we began with the individual items listed on the left in Figure 2,
but considered their internal organization further. Beginning with
factor analysis and then adjusting and deleting items to achieve
factors with good internal consistencies, we arrived at the four
factors on the right in Figure 2. Items such as infant and maternal
affect and joint engagement summed into a highly consistent fac-
tor (Factor 1), which we labeled as “action–emotion synchrony.”
Infant responsiveness and parental non-intrusiveness loaded highly
onto Factor 2, which we called, “mother–infant responsiveness.”
The items maternal sensitivity and infant gaze following loaded
highly onto Factor 3, which we labeled “mother–infant sensi-
tivity.” And finally, several additional items captured a social-
temperament factor that we called “infant social attentiveness”
(Factor 4).
We entered these four derived factors—those on the right in
Figure 2—into a regression predicting our primary habituation
measure. To test the possibility that something like general object-
centered attentiveness or general cognitive “maturity” would
account for our findings, we entered the object-attentivenessmea-
sure noted earlier as well as age into this regression predicting
our primary habituation measure; this step was not significant.
We then entered our four key social factors, and those factors
accounted for an additional 17% of variance in our habituation
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measure, R2change = 0.17, Fchange (4,63) = 3.31, p < 0.05. In this
model, the infant social attentiveness aggregate (b= 0.26, t= 2.01,
p < 0.05) and mother–infant responsiveness aggregate (b = 0.25,
t= 2.01, p< 0.05) were independent predictors of social attention
during the habituation portion of the looking-time study.
Discussion
These findings indicate that infant social cognition, as demon-
strated by performance in infant looking-time procedures, does
relate to infants’ social interactive behavior. More specifically,
individual differences in how infants parse and habituate to inten-
tional action displays within laboratory looking-time research
clearly relates to mother–infant interaction patterns, in particu-
lar the quality of mother–infant interaction. Additionally, infant
looking-time performance also relates to infants’ social tempera-
ment, in particular, their disposition for attending to another per-
son’s social behaviors (e.g., facial expressions and speech). These
relations between looking-time performance and aspects of infant
social experience provide validity to the assertion that common
laboratory assessments of social-cognitive understanding do, in
fact, tap important formative social understandings in infants.
Fortunately, our study does not stand alone; a small set of
other research has tackled similar issues (generally pathway 1 in
Figure 1). Brune and Woodward (2007) reported that 10-month-
olds’ looking-time responses to a display linking a person’s gaze
to an intended object was related to their engagement in joint
attention during a mother–infant play session. Hofer et al. (2008)
reported that 6-month-olds whose mothers were rated to have a
modestly controlling interaction style encoded actions in terms of
the agent’s goals, while those whose mothers were rated as sensi-
tive or unresponsive did not. In an integration of looking-time and
attachment research, Johnson et al. (2007) showed that securely
attached infants (but not insecurely attached ones) looked signif-
icantly longer at an animated display in which a large “mother”
object appeared to intentionally abandon a smaller “baby” object.
More recently, Licata et al. (2014) reported a study that
partly parallels ours, but with 7-month-olds. These authors had
37 infants participate in Woodward’s intention-understanding
looking-time task (e.g., Woodward, 1998) and then videotaped
mother–infant interaction in a 10-min free play episode. They
assessed mother–infant interaction by using Biringen’s (2000,
2008) Emotional Availability Scale, which involves global ratings
of six dimensions such as maternal-sensitivity, maternal non-
intrusiveness, and child-responsiveness. These dimensions were
highly intercorrelated, so in a regression analysis controlling for
age and infant activity level they entered only a general emotion-
availability (EA) aggregate. EA was a significant predictor of chil-
dren’s looking-time performances. Licata et al. (2014) concluded
that EA captured general mother–infant interaction quality; thus
combining their findings with ours, the quality of mother–infant
interaction significantly relates to infant intention understand-
ing as measured in looking-time tasks for 7-, 10-, 11-, and 12-
month-olds. Interestingly, both we (Dunphy-Lelii et al., 2014)
and Licata et al. (2014) also collected measures of maternal-
mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 2003) from the free-play interac-
tions, and in neither study did mind-mindedness predict infants’
looking-time intention understanding.
Because this first study (as well as the ones by Brune and
Woodward, 2007; Licata et al., 2014) was concurrent, we could
reveal relations between the laboratory and semi-naturalistic
social experiences, but could not determine the direction of these
relations: Infant social-interactive experiences and proclivities
could contribute to enhanced intention understanding and vice
versa. Indeed, as we hypothesize in pathway 1 of Figure 1, most
likely the relationship is bi-directional and transactional.
Study 2: Looking-Time Differences Predict
4-Year-Old Theory of Mind
In Study 2, we examined whether looking-time measures in
infancy predict later social-cognitive understanding. Beginning
with a study by Wellman et al. (2004), several studies have now
examined this link—pathway 2 in Figure 1. But the current study,
an updated version of Wellman et al. (2008), provides the most
extensive and controlled evidence that we are aware of for a
pathway from infants’ laboratory assessed social cognition to later
preschool theory of mind. Formeasures of infant social cognition,
we examined looking-time behaviors on the habituation task used
in Study 1. For preschool theory ofmind, wemeasured false-belief
understandings.
Overview of Study 2
Forty-five of the 10- to 12-month-old infants that participated
in the looking-time habituation task in Study 1 returned to the
laboratory at approximately 4 years of age to participate in a series
of cognitive assessments. Focally these children were assessed on
their theory of mind.
We also assessed children’s IQ, language competence (vocab-
ulary), and executive functioning at 4-years because theory of
mind has been linked to maturity of general information pro-
cessing abilities. Moreover, for 40 years, it has been clear that
infant attention to perceptual-object displays (such as familiar
vs. novel objects and images) in looking-time studies predicts
later IQ (Bornstein and Sigman, 1986; McCall and Carriger,
1993). These perceptual-attention findings are consistently inter-
preted as demonstrating developmental continuity in general
information processing, such as memory-encoding or execu-
tive function. Conceivably, correlations between infant intention-
understanding and preschool theory of mind might represent
just another example of continuity in such general cognitive pro-
cessing, as opposed to continuity more specific to a domain of
social cognition. Thus, we included measures to account for this
possibility.
Social-Cognitive Measures
Study 2 utilized the same infant looking-time measure described
in Study 1—decrement of attention during habituation to
intentional-action displays. Children’s preschool theory of mind
was assessed with several measures. Importantly, children com-
pleted two explicit false-belief tasks because these provide the
most often used, standard assessment for preschool theory of
mind (Wellman et al., 2001): a standard, contents false-belief task
(from Wellman and Liu’s (2004), theory-of-mind scale) and a
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standard, change-of-locations task (a Sally–Anne task of the type
first used by Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The scores from these two
tasks were summed to form a false-belief composite.
IQ and Executive Function Measures
For a brief IQ assessment we used two subscales of the Wechsler
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI; Wechsler,
1989) Vocabulary (ameasure of verbal aptitude) and BlockDesign
(a non-verbal measure tapping various capacities, including spa-
tial understanding and logic).
Executive functions encompass several constructs (e.g., Zelazo
et al., 1997), but, of these constructs, inhibitory control yields
the strongest relations to theory of mind (Carlson and Moses,
2001). Inhibition also deserves attention because it has been
posited to explain the continuity of IQ from infancy to child-
hood (McCall, 1994; McCall and Mash, 1995). We used two
common assessments of preschool inhibitory control—Whisper
and Bear/Dragon (Kochanska et al., 1996; Carlson and Moses,
2001). For example, in the whisper task, children see 10 cartoon
characters, some well-known (e.g., Winnie the Pooh, Elmo) and
some not (e.g., Marvin theMartian, Petunia the Pig) and are asked
to whisper the names of the characters that they know. Children
are inclined to blurt loudly the names of the characters they know,
and thus whispers reflect more sophisticated inhibitory control
and earn children higher scores on this task.
Findings
Focally, children’s scores as infants in the looking-time task
were correlated with their preschool theory of mind. Chil-
dren’s looking-time performance during infancy negatively cor-
related with the false belief composite when controlling for age,
r(42) =  0.38, p = 0.01. That is, infants who sustained inter-
est in (and therefore had smaller decrements in attention to)
human intentional action displays during habituation at 1 year
had enhanced theory of mind at age 4-years as indexed by better
performance on the false belief tasks. Conceivably this associa-
tion might be fully explained by verbal competence, performance
competence (or a combination of the two representing overall
IQ), and/or executive function. However, when we simultane-
ously controlled for age at infant testing, WPPSI Vocabulary and
Block Design, and both executive function tasks, the relation
between infant decrement of attention and preschool false-belief
understanding remained significant, r(35)=  0.38, p< 0.05.
Discussion
This second study demonstrated that, not only are individual dif-
ferences in infant looking-time performance to intentional action
displays predicted by parent–infant social interactive experiences,
those looking-time differences also predict later theory of mind at
4 years of age. Moreover, just as for Study 1, our data are not the
only relevant findings.
Specifically, Wellman et al. (2004) initially found a correlation
between infant social attention and 4-year-olds’ performance on
a false-belief composite for eighteen 14-month-olds. Replicating
Wellman et al. (2004), Aschersleben et al. (2008) found a similar
correlation between infant attention to goal-directed action and
4-year-old false-belief understanding for 20 German 6-months-
olds. Yamaguchi et al. (2009) also reported a similar result:
4-month-old attention to goal-directed action (in a simpler
procedure using animated circles and triangles) predicted later
theory of mind (false-belief understanding) in a group of 17 U.S.
children. Moreover, in a parallel study of fifteen 4-month-old
infants, attention to physical stimuli (i.e., discrimination of tones
rather than intentional-action stimuli) did not predict later theory
of mind at 4 years (Yamaguchi et al., 2009). Notably, the 45 infants
in our Study 2 more than doubled the samples used in these other
studies and yielded a substantial correlation between later false-
belief understanding and 10- to 12-month olds’ social attention.
Across several of these studies, the relation between infant
social attention and later theory ofmind is consistent and robust in
the sense of remaining essentially undiminished when measures
of more general cognitive processes are controlled. Wellman et al.
(2004) used a singlemeasure of verbal IQ (PeabodyPictureVocab-
ulary Test); Aschersleben et al. (2008) used a single composite
measure of language competence (the SETK; Grimm, 2001). And,
as just noted, Yamaguchi et al. (2009) showed that one measure
of attention to physical displays failed to predict later theory of
mind. Of course, any single control is limited. For this reason,
we examined multiple measures of general cognitive processing
including verbal and non-verbal measures of general IQ and
measures of executive functioning. More generally, verbal com-
petence, general IQ, and executive function are complementary
aspects of general information processing that make substan-
tial and independent contributions to preschool theory-of-mind
performance. Our Study-2 findings demonstrate continuity from
infant social attention to preschool theory of mind with all three
factors measured and controlled.
This social-cognitive continuity is consistently evident formea-
sures of attention during habituation, but within the same studies
(Wellman et al., 2004, 2008; Aschersleben et al., 2008), it does
not appear for measures of test event looking (but see, Yamaguchi
et al., 2009). We return to this issue in the General Discus-
sion. Regardless, social cognition evidences distinctive infant-to-
preschool continuities indicating that theory of mind constitutes
its own domain of cognitive development. Infant social-cognitive
understanding is not only early achieved as revealed in sensitive
looking-time paradigms, it is formative for further developmental
advances in theory of mind as hypothesized in pathway 2 of
Figure 1.
Study 3: Using Infant Individual Differences
to Predict Preschool Social Cognition
While important, infant looking-time measures do not capture
all of infant social cognitions or all of the predictive variance
between infant social competence and experience and later social
cognition. Indeed, Study 1 shows that the infant looking-time
data and social-interactive measures interrelate. One possibility,
therefore, is that looking-timemeasures are essentially a proxy for
early infant–mother social experiences that themselves influence
later social cognition including theory of mind. Or, more in line
with the pathways outlined in Figure 1, it is possible that both
social-cognitive competence (indexed in looking-time studies)
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and social-interactive behavior and temperament might indepen-
dently contribute to the further development of preschool social
cognition. If that is the case, then we would want to know the
extent to which both types of measures utilized in concert predict
preschool social-cognitive outcomes. We tackle these issues in
Study 3.
In this final study we take advantage of the fact that the children
for whom we have longitudinal data in Study 2 were also in Study
1. Thus we can combine information about social differences
in the parent–infant interaction measures focal to Study 1, plus
looking-time differences focal to Studies 1 and 2, as well as theory-
of-minddata from the same children at 4 years of age. This allowed
us to address several crucial questions: What features of infant
social-cognitive and social-interaction experiences combine to
best predict later theory of mind?What factors are, separately, the
most influential? And what is the total predictive power of these
factors?
Overview of Study 3
Forty-three children participated in a series of social interaction
and social-cognitive assessments: mother–infant interactions and
looking-time habituation tasks at 10–12 months of age, as well
as theory of mind tasks at 4 years. Social-interaction measures,
looking-time measures, and preschool theory of mind measures
were those described in Studies 1 and 2.
Findings
We used regression modeling to determine the independent
and joint contributions of infant social-interactive measures (i.e.,
the four measures: quality of mother–infant interaction, socially
observant infant temperament, infant joint attention, and imita-
tion) and habituation scores to children’s theory of mind at age 4.
Given the number of measures, not all participants had complete
data. Specifically, seven participants were missing data at random;
therefore, five iterations of imputation were performed in order to
predict the values of the missing data. The participants that were
missing data did not differ systematically from the other children
in terms of demographics or the other variables of interest (quality
of mother–infant interaction, socially observant temperament,
joint attention, or imitation). In all five iterations the exact same
patterns of significance and non-significance emerged, therefore
we report the results based on the pooled values of the five
imputations.
Again, to test the possibility that something like general object-
centered attentiveness or general “maturity” would account for
our findings, we first entered the infant object-attentiveness mea-
sure as well as age into a regression predicting false-belief unders-
tanding at age 4; this was not significant,R2= 0.07, F(2,38)= 0.27,
p = 0.47. Entering our four infant social-interactive measures
combined with habituation scores in a second separate analy-
sis did significantly predict children’s theory of mind at age 4,
R2= 0.27, F(5,37)= 2.79, p< 0.05.Of the fivemeasures, the infant
habituation measure (t = 2.83, p < 0.01) and socially observant
temperament (t = 2.34, p < 0.05) independently significantly
predicted performance on the false-belief tasks.
Similarly, using stepwise regression, the model including the
four infant social-interactive aggregates and the habituation
measure was reduced to two independent and significant pre-
dictors of preschool false belief understanding: socially observant
infant temperament and the infant habituation measure. Socially
observant infant temperament and infant performance on the
looking-time task predicted 26% of the variability in preschool
false belief understanding, R2 = 0.26, F(2,40)= 2.87, p< 0.05.
Discussion
Study 3 demonstrates that both infant performance differences
in looking-time paradigms and parent–infant interaction dif-
ferences, and especially infant social temperament differences,
independently predict later theory-of-mind performance. Nei-
ther is a mere proxy for the other, and together infant individ-
ual differences of both sorts more powerfully predict preschool
social cognition. Indeed, when our several predictive factors were
entered jointly, the overall regression model accounted for a
sizable amount of variance in preschool theory of mind, and
two variables alone—one looking-time measure and one social-
interaction measure—accounted for 26% of the variability in
4-year-olds’ false belief performance.
Pathways from infant social-interaction experiences to later
social cognition (pathway 3 in Figure 1) are not well studied, but,
still, our Study-3 findings are complemented by several others.
Nelson et al. (2008) examined 30 min of mother–infant interac-
tion for children aged 18–21 months. From that they extracted
severalmeasures of joint attention or joint engagement and related
these to children’s false-belief competence as 4-year-olds. Two
measures were particularly predictive: Coordinated joint engage-
ment (where infant as well as mother managed the dyad’s joint
attention to events) and symbol-infused joint engagement (where
child participation in joint events included verbal reference to
both the mother and to the events). Higher amounts of coor-
dinated and symbol-infused joint engagement in these toddlers
significantly predicted better false-belief performance when the
children were 4 years of age, and did so even after language
competence was controlled. Likewise, in an early study of a small
sample of 13 infants, joint attention at 20 months (measured as
gaze switching between an adult and a salient toy in a labora-
tory task) was predictive of later preschool-age theory of mind,
and remained significant after IQ and language competence were
partialed out (Charman et al., 2000).
Other measures of infant social-cognitive understanding could
also be related to later preschool theory-of-mind performance.
Recently, investigators of infant social cognition have expanded
beyond examination of infants’ understanding of intentional
action and emotion to focus on infants’ implicit understanding of
agents’ knowledge and beliefs as well (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Buttelmann et al., 2009). Implicit
understanding of false belief is assessed via violation of expecta-
tion looking-time studies as well as anticipatory lookingmeasured
via eye-trackingmethods. Thoermer et al. (2012) have shown that
belief-based anticipatory looking measures at 18 months of age
longitudinally predict false-belief reasoning on standard verbal
preschool tasks at 48 months.
Note that our study goes beyond such prior research in includ-
ing younger infants and in including both social-interactive and
looking-time measures. To reiterate, together infant individual
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differences of both sorts more powerfully predicted preschool
social cognition.
General Discussion
Returning to Figure 1, contemporary research on early child-
hood understanding of the social world should ideally encompass
numerous constructs studied in the lab and in social interac-
tions and, crucially, the transactional and longitudinal pathways
that form and contextualize such understandings. While the
field has, for the most part, explored bits and pieces of this
developmental system separately, the appropriate combination
of constructs, approaches, and ages can provide a clearer pic-
ture of the developmental trajectory of children’s social-cognitive
understanding.
In this paper, we reviewed evidence from three studies con-
ducted by our research group that examined pathways 1, 2,
and 3 in our theoretical framework. We demonstrated that
infants’ social-cognitive understanding, as measured by labo-
ratory performance on social-cognitive tasks, was significantly
associated with individual differences in social-interactive expe-
riences and infant social temperaments (pathway 1). We also
demonstrated that both infant social-cognitive understanding
and infant social-interactive experiences and temperaments con-
tributed independently to later social-cognitive competencies,
specifically preschool theory of mind (pathways 2 and 3). And
they do so even after age, IQ, language competence, and executive
function are controlled.
It seems of special note that among our predictors, socially
observant infant temperament was an important predictor of
infant social cognition in looking-time tests, as well as a par-
ticularly important predictor of later, preschool social cognition.
This finding takes its place beside an emerging set of findings
concerning relations between preschool temperament and theory
of mind achievements—preschoolers who are shy, socially obser-
vant, and non-reactive outperform their peers on false-belief tasks
(Wellman et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2013). What we add to these
findings are data from infants and that infants’ socially-observant
temperament relates to their social cognition both concurrently
(at 1 year) but also longitudinally, during the preschool years.
Importantly, Mink et al. (2014) have also recently reported that
infants with a shy temperament at 18-months exhibit a more
advanced theory of mind by the early preschool years.
Note that this research showing early links between socially
observant temperament and theory of mind spans several coun-
tries and cultures: the U.S. (the current studies; Wellman et al.,
2011), China (Lane et al., 2013), and Germany (Mink et al.,
2014). This is an impressive beginning, but of course, further
research with other samples and especially with infants would be
welcome. More generally, it will be important to determine the
extent to which these relations between infant understanding of
intentional agents, their social-interactive experiences, and early
social-cognitive developments exist for other realms of social-
cognition, not just theory of mind, but, for example, in infants’
and preschoolers’ moral intuitions.
We hasten to emphasize that this social attentiveness—reflected
in both infant socially observant temperament as well as
maintenance of interest in intentional action displays in our
looking-time paradigms—should not be thought of as a purely
dispositional factor inherent to the infant. In Study 1 social
attentiveness, as measured by infant “temperament” ratings, was
related to measures of mother–infant interaction and interaction
quality. In Licata et al. (2014) attention to intentional action
in their looking-time task was related to maternal emotional
availability. In short, enhanced attention to social actors and
social interactions in infancy powerfully impacts early childhood
social cognition, but that enhanced social attention can be due
to the efforts of the infant, the infant’s social partners, or mostly
likely to both in concert. Determining the nature and social
shaping of social attentiveness in early life is probably the single
topic now most worth increased research efforts.
There are other pathways apparent in Figure 1 that we have
not touched on here. For example, it is now well established that
preschool theory of mind impacts preschoolers’ social behavior,
such as the skilled interactions with and hence popularity with
their peers (e.g., Watson et al., 1999; Diesendruck and Ben-
Eliyahu, 2006), their ability to tell lies (e.g., Lee, 2013), their
attempts to persuade others (e.g., Bartsch and London, 2000)
and their engagement in games like hide-and seek (Peskin and
Ardino, 2003). And preschool social behaviors, such as engaging
in pretend play (e.g., Jenkins and Astington, 2000), engaging
in family conversation about mind and emotion (e.g., Ruffman
et al., 2002), and living in a family full of siblings and extended
family members (e.g., Peterson, 2000), enhance preschool theory
of mind. However, in keeping with a focus that includes infants,
the remaining pathway of most import is the diagonal from infant
social cognition to preschool social behavior. We know of no
research that has tackled this pathway; it now seems of special
import for future research.
More specific aspects of our findings also deserve mention.
First, bothmore and less sustained attention to intentional action
displays relate to infants’ interactions and later competences. Both
of these relations make sense: Steeper decrement of attention in
habituation can reflect coming more quickly to a consolidated
and intentional understanding of action. It can index infants’
ability to parse intentional action displays meaningfully and thus
habituate to them. Hypothetically, infants who more quickly
habituate to complex displays of the sort that we present could be
more practiced at understanding intentional action regularities
and thus more quickly become habituated to them. That sort of
relation may very well underpin the positive relation between
decrement of attention and parent–infant interaction measures
we found in Study 1.
At the same time, more sustained attention–and hence com-
ing more slowly and less “steeply” to habituation criteria—could
reflect greater interest in and deeper processing of intentional
action. And such sustained attention to human intentional actions
could promote later more advanced understanding. That sort of
relation may very well underpin the negative relation we found
between decrement of attention and later theory of mind in Study
2. Similarly, the relation between our infant temperament ratings
and later theory of mind that we found in Study 3 seems to
reflect the power of sustained, enhanced, infant social attentive-
ness.
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Notably, this mix of significant relations, including both more
quickly parsing intentional action and also greater attention to
intentional action, occurs not only in our three studies but also
throughout the literature. In Wellman et al. (2004) the relation
between infant decrement of attention and later false-belief was
positive, suggesting that by 14 months more quickly parsing
intentional action predicts theory of mind at 4 years. Yet, to
repeat, in Study 2 here (and thus in Wellman et al., 2008) the
relation was negative. So for 10- and 12-month-olds, more sus-
tained attention to intentional action displays predicted theory of
mind at 4 years. Perhaps, then, for younger infants the key factor
is sustained attention in habituation, but for older infants it is
quicker, fluent intention-action processing. That cannot be the
whole story, however, because in Aschersleben et al.’s (2008) study
using a very different intention-action habituation display with
6-month-olds, it was infants who more quickly habituated—thus
showing a larger attention decrement in habituation—that proved
better at false-belief understanding as 4-year-olds. This abun-
dance of differing relations requires closer scrutiny in future
research.
Second, in our research and others (e.g., Aschersleben et al.,
2008), it was infants’ attention to intentional-action displays dur-
ing habituation trials and not test trials that was especially reveal-
ing. Thus, social-cognitive processing revealed during habituation
has proved particularly important. Yet, Brune and Woodward
(2007) and Licata et al. (2014) found that, given their looking-
time task, infant differences in response to novelty were also
significantly related to parent–infant social behavior. Notably, our
data, in contrast to theirs, demonstrate important continuities
between our infant measures and preschool social cognition. This
is an important addition, but the full pattern of relations between
social cognition and social interaction, and the full pattern of
continuities from infant intentional understandings plus social
interactions to later theory of mind is an important topic for
further research.
To summarize, future research should continue to explore
the theoretical framework that we present here. Our research,
along with the work of others, provides a strong foundation
supporting conclusions that infants’ social-cognitive understand-
ing, their social-interactive experiences, and their social temper-
aments significantly inter-correlate and contribute to later social-
cognitive competencies. However, several remaining portions of
the framework deserve further exploration. First, we proposed a
number of pathways that have not yet been evaluated in the liter-
ature. How does infant social cognition relate to later preschool
social interactions and behaviors? Additionally, future research
should continue to assess the nature of the pathways between
laboratory-based assessments of social cognition and later social
understanding that we have only just begun to explore. More
evidence is required to understand how individual differences
in sustained attention and decrement of attention relate to later
social developments. Additionally, the influence of sensitivity to
novelty and sensitivity to familiar social stimuli should also be
assessed.
To conclude, in keeping with the focus of this special issue, we
demonstrate the importance of individual differences in research
on early social cognition. Our specific focus was on individual dif-
ferences anchored in infancy, particularly differences in everyday
mother–infant interaction as well as laboratory-based looking-
time tasks. Our results demonstrate that both approaches generate
informative measures of individual differences, and that more-
over used together such measures can be especially compelling.
Future research on children’s social development should not focus
solely on laboratory-based habituation measures nor individual
differences in social experiences, but the combination of the
two. More generally, our studies, along with recent confirmatory
findings from Licata et al. (2014), Mink et al. (2014), Brune and
Woodward (2007) and the like, underscore that social-cognitive
development is a constructive process based in social interaction
and observation.
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